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A leading classical utilitarian, John Stuart Mill is an unlikely contributor to the 
public reason tradition in political philosophy. To hold that social rules or political 
institutions are justified by their contribution to overall happiness is to deny that they 
are justified by their being the object of consensus or convergence among all those 
holding qualified moral or political viewpoints. For the utilitarian, the existence of 
consensus or convergence might be evidence of a tendency to overall happiness and 
help to establish conditions of security and coordination necessary for it, but it does 
not constitute the fundamental choiceworthiness of the rules or institutions. In this 
chapter, I do not mean to challenge that baseline utilitarian understanding of Mill’s 
moral and political framework. But I do want to explore the surprising ways in which 
he nevertheless works to accommodate the problems and insights of the public 
reason tradition, and the extent to which he makes arguments that can help those 
working within that tradition. This is important not only for a richer understanding 
of Mill’s utilitarian ethics and how consequentialists might address themselves to 
the public reason project, but also for those interested in the ongoing significance of 
Mill’s liberal principles after the turn to public reason in the work of Rawls, 
Larmore, Gaus, and others.  
In what follows I try to show how Mill’s utilitarian theory incorporates the claim 
that the demands of social life require a publicly accepted set of normative 
expectations to govern judgments about when one has met one’s obligations and, 
relatedly, about the appropriateness of blame or punishment. For Mill, such a social 
morality properly regulates these judgments even if it is not ideal, that is, even if it 
is not the set of rules the adoption of which would collectively maximize utility. 
Importantly, however, social morality is not static. It shapes our collective existence 
by defining the proper bounds of our practices of accountability even as it evolves 
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over time. And, as we shall see, Mill identifies principles of public reason that he 
believes should guide the development of social morality. 
Ultimately, I believe, Mill’s account of social morality remains consistent with 
his act utilitarian commitment that what makes actions fundamentally choiceworthy 
is their expediency or contribution to overall happiness (whether or not they are 
blameworthy). But seeing how Mill’s discussion of social morality fits within his 
overall ethical theory helps to resolve debates about passages in which he seems to 
endorse an account of moral right and wrong at odds with act utilitarianism. With 
this unified account of Mill’s ethical theory on the table, we can explore the extent 
to which it allows him to offer arguments about the shape of our social practices and 
political institutions in the spirit of public reason liberalism, and not always by direct 
appeal to the principle of utility.  
In section 2, I begin to examine those places where Mill expresses the need for 
social morality—publicly recognized social rules by which we appropriately hold 
each other accountable—and addresses what is required to maintain its integrity as 
it develops over time. It is hard to imagine anyone denying the value of such a social 
morality, but that is partly the point. Because act utilitarianism is commonly 
caricatured as failing to respect social rules as the appropriate governors of our 
actions, it is worth seeing how they are treated in a fully developed “sophisticated” 
act utilitarian system such as Mill’s.2 In fact, he makes a great deal of the fact that 
maintaining the integrity of publicly recognized social rules is necessary for 
cooperative society to exist at all.3 This justifies a general commitment, on one hand, 
to restrain our own actions in accordance with those social rules and, on the other, 
to appeal to them in assigning blame or punishment to others. Mill not only explores 
the historical circumstances necessary for stable social rules to persist—most 
interestingly, in a non-despotic, liberal system—but also argues that, except in 
exceptional cases, individuals’ practical deliberation and judgments of holding each 
other accountable should extend no further than those social rules.4 
 
1. EXPEDIENCY AND BLAMEWORTHINESS 
 
It is important to appreciate a complication for interpreting Mill’s overall ethical 
theory: that he sometimes uses the terms “morality,” “moral,” and the like to refer 
to the utilitarian standard of what makes actions fundamentally choiceworthy 
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(namely, their expediency or actual contribution to overall happiness) and other 
times uses those same terms to refer to a standard of blameworthiness that does not 
involve direct appeal to the principle of utility (but rather to whether a person has 
met social expectations in deciding to act).  
There are numerous examples of the first sense of “morality” in Mill’s work. In 
chapter 2 of Utilitarianism he summarizes his moral theory this way: 
 
According to the Greatest Happiness Principle… the ultimate end, with reference 
to and for the sake of which all other things are desirable (whether we are 
considering our own good or that of other people), is an existence exempt as far 
as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments, both in point of 
quantity and quality… This, being, according to the utilitarian opinion, the end 
of human action, is necessarily also the standard of morality; which may 
accordingly be defined, the rules and precepts for human conduct, by the 
observance of which an existence such as has been described might be, to the 
greatest extent possible, secured to all mankind; and not to them only, but, so far 
as the nature of things admits, to the whole sentient creation. (CW X.214; 
emphasis added) 
 
In other passages he similarly refers to “the principle of utility—which is a theory 
of right and wrong” (“Sedgwick’s Discourse” (1835), CW X.71) or notes in passing 
that “right means productive of happiness, and wrong productive of misery” (“An 
Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy” [Hamilton] (1865), CW 
IX.456). In a summary of the argument of chapter 2 of Utilitarianism he writes, “The 
only true or definite rule of conduct or standard of morality is the greatest happiness” 
(Diary (1854), CW XXVII.663). 
These and related passages place Mill within familiar utilitarian territory, 
according to which (ignoring some intramural disputes) actions are morally right 
insofar as they maximize overall utility, and wrong to the extent that they fail to do 
so.  
But Mill then goes on to make rather different claims, appealing to a second sense 
of “morality” that is specifically about moral obligation or duty. He argues that moral 
duty is defined by those standards of conduct to which competent individuals are 
appropriately held accountable in any given state of society, even if reasons of 
expediency or overall utility speak against actually holding someone accountable in 
a particular case. To fail to fulfill one’s moral duties in this sense is to make oneself 
the appropriate target of blame or punishment:  
 
No case can be pointed out in which we consider anything as a duty, and any act 
or omission as immoral or wrong, without regarding the person who commits the 
wrong and violates the duty as a fit object of punishment… even if there are 
preponderant reasons of another kind against inflicting the suffering. (James 
Mill’s Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind [Analysis] (1869), CW 
XXXI.241-2)  
 
We do not call anything wrong, unless we mean to imply that a person ought to 
be punished in some way or other for doing it; if not by law, by the opinion of 
his fellow creatures; if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own conscience. 
This seems to be the real turning point of the distinction between morality and 
simple expediency… Reasons of prudence, or the interest of other people, may 
militate against actually exacting it; but the person himself, it is clearly 
understood, would not be entitled to complain. There are other things, on the 
contrary, which we wish that people should do, which we like or admire them for 
doing, perhaps dislike or despise them for not doing, but yet admit that they are 
not bound to do; it is not a case of moral obligation; we do not blame them, that 
is, we do not think that they are proper objects of punishment.” (Utilitarianism 
(1861), CW X.246; emphasis added) 
 
In these passages, moral wrongness is identified with blameworthiness, that is, 
with the failure to do that for which the agent is appropriately held accountable. Mill 
here seems to reject the utilitarian standard of moral wrongness because, surely, one 
is not always a fit object of blame or punishment for failing to maximize utility. 
Though some have wondered whether he thereby gives up his utilitarianism or holds 
two conflicting standards of moral rightness, I believe the difficulty here is merely 
verbal. We should not get hung up on Mill’s use of “moral,” but rather accept that 
he has identified two non-conflicting categories of evaluation that are both always 
relevant and important to the assessment of any action. In the first category, we 
evaluate actions according to whether they are expedient or conducive to overall 
happiness. In the second, we evaluate actions according to whether they meet or 
exceed the expectations we have of each other (whatever happens to be expedient), 
which we may enforce against each other through practices of blame or other 
punishment.5 This is the standard of social morality, the shared set of normative 
                                                          
5 Peter Railton (1988, 2005) makes a similar distinction between what is expedient and what social 
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of view’. But moral wrongness goes with notions of blameworthiness, condemnation, resentment, 
expectations among competent persons in a given state of society.6 These shared 
normative expectations comprise those “acts which the general experience of life… 
warrant us in counting upon” (Analysis, CW XXXI.241) and define our moral duties. 
For most cases, they are encapsulated by general practical rules. 
I want to emphasize three features of making this distinction between expediency 
on one hand, and social morality or duty or blameworthiness on the other. First, for 
Mill, the failure to perform an action that maximizes utility need not count as a 
failure of moral duty. An action might be inexpedient yet still not open someone to 
censure, given current social expectations. Conversely, one might fail one’s moral 
duty even when one has maximized utility. One might act rashly or otherwise fail to 
meet social expectations, yet perform the expedient action.7 
Second, the distinction allows for a domain of supererogatory action in which an 
individual exceeds shared normative expectations. These actions Mill calls 
“meritorious,” and are part of a “region of positive worthiness” in which “there is an 
unlimited range of moral worth, up to the most exalted heroism, which should be 
fostered by every positive encouragement, though not converted into an obligation” 
(Auguste Comte and Positivism (1865), CW X.337, 339). 
Third, for Mill, a person’s blameworthiness is not a matter of whether it would 
be expedient to blame that person in the particular case. As he indicates in both 
passages quoted above, a person can be blameworthy even if reasons of expediency 
or prudence ultimately tell against holding the person accountable. What matters is 
that the person is a “fit” object of punishment and “would not be entitled to 
complain” if he or she were held to account.8 For Mill, our deserving blame or 
punishment comes down to “our knowledge that punishment will be just: that by 
such conduct we shall place ourselves in the position in which our fellow creatures, 
or the Deity, or both, will naturally, and may justly, inflict punishment upon us” 
(Hamilton, CW IX.461). Mill emphasizes that the word “justly” here does not refer 
directly to what is expedient or right, but (as I read him) to the idea that others may 
rightfully decide this matter. It is true that, for Mill, any allocation of rightful 
authority over certain matters will ultimately be justified by expediency. But with 
respect to blameworthiness, his point is that others may rightfully judge a member 
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the indirect “sanction utilitarianism” reading of his account of the rightness of actions. Mill gives 
us two direct standards. 
of the community in light of shared normative expectations. Within those limits it is 
under others’ discretion whether to blame or otherwise punish that person. Thus, 
even if they hold that person accountable when doing so would not be expedient, it 
remains the case that their holding him or her to account was rightful. 
One thought justifying this claim about our rightful authority to hold each other 
accountable is that any person “must recognise it as not unjust that others should 
protect themselves against any disposition on his part to infringe their rights” (Ibid.). 
Social morality is constituted in part by the shared standards that define rights and 
their corresponding obligations, and we are well placed to hold others accountable 
for violations of our own rights even if we might choose not to do so in certain cases 
and even if doing so might be inexpedient in certain cases.  
In a passage unpublished in his lifetime, Mill makes the point that if there were 
no need to enforce shared expectations, there would be no need for “morality” in the 
second sense – of social morality.9 Writing to Harriet, his future wife and 
collaborator, and praising her “higher nature,” he remarks that:  
 
If all persons were like these [i.e., had higher natures], or even would be guided 
by these, morality might be very different from what it must now be; or rather it 
would not exist at all as morality, since morality and inclination would coincide. 
If all resembled you, my lovely friend, it would be idle to prescribe rules for them. 
By following their own impulses under the guidance of their own judgment, they 
would find more happiness, and would confer more, than by obeying any moral 
principles or maxims whatever… Where there exists a genuine and strong desire 
to do that which is most for the happiness of all, general rules are merely aids to 
prudence, in the choice of means; not peremptory obligations. 
…All the difficulties of morality in any of its branches, grow out of the 
conflict which continually arises between the highest morality and even the best 
popular morality which the degree of development yet attained by average human 
nature, will allow to exist. (“On Marriage,” CW XXI.39; emphasis added) 
 
Note that in the imagined case, in the absence of practices of blame and punishment, 
the principle of utility would still provide a standard by which to praise our 
inclinations and decisions. 
The rest of this chapter grapples with those passages in Mill that bear on the need 
for social morality, how it changes, and its place within his overall ethical theory. I 
do not claim to provide a complete account of this part of Mill’s ethical theory, but 
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the Collected Works, I believe we can treat it as providing some clue to Mill’s thinking, when 
viewed in light of other evidence. 
I hope to introduce the main features of it and (given the aims of the present volume) 
highlight a variety of his writings that are not often given their due. Why do we need 
social morality? Is it, in any interesting sense, independent of the principle of utility? 
What should I do when social morality conflicts with my understanding of what 
utility requires? In trying to answer these questions, I hope to show that Mill 
demonstrates a remarkable sensitivity to the demands of public reason. 
 
2. PRIVATE CONFLICT AND A “COMMON SYSTEM OF OPINIONS” 
 
We have already noted that the rules of social morality are relative to a given “state 
of society.” This is due in part to the fact that states of society differ in the prevailing 
beliefs, including moral beliefs, of those living in them: 
 
What is called a state of society, is the simultaneous state of all the greater social 
facts or phenomena. Such are, the degree of knowledge, and of intellectual and 
moral culture, existing in the community, and in every class of it; the state of 
industry, of wealth and its distribution; the habitual occupations of the 
community; their division into classes, and the relations of those classes to one 
another; the common beliefs which they entertain on all the subjects most 
important to mankind, and the degree of assurance with which those beliefs are 
held; their tastes, and the character and degree of their aesthetic development; 
their form of government, and the more important of their laws and customs. The 
condition of all these things, and of many more which will readily suggest 
themselves, constitute the state of society or the state of civilization at any given 
time. (A System of Logic [Logic] (1843), CW VIII.911-12; emphasis added) 
 
For Mill, then, the rules of social morality vary not only with different economic and 
political circumstances, but according to what the people in a given time and place 
commonly value and believe. This is important because Mill believes that, if society 
is to exist at all and to persist over time, it requires a widely-accepted set of opinions 
to serve as a public standard.  
The problem, as Mill sees it, starts with a Hobbesian state of nature marked by 
“private conflict” and devoid of the cooperative benefits that social morality and law 
allow: 
 
A rude people though in some degree alive to the benefits of civilized society, 
may be unable to practice the forbearances which it demands: their passions may 
be too violent, or their personal pride too exacting, to forgo private conflict, and 
leave to the laws the avenging of their real or supposed wrongs. (Considerations 
on Representative Government [CRG] (1861), CW XIX.377)10  
 
In Mill’s account of social development, the path to “civilized” society—that is, 
to a cooperative society within which most individuals are motivated to compromise 
and to engage in joint endeavors11—is uncertain. In fact, again echoing Hobbes, he 
suspects that cooperative society cannot get a foothold without the help of some 
external power, such as a powerful despot, to begin to train individuals to work 
together.  
 
…a people in a state of savage independence, in which every one lives for 
himself, exempt, unless by fits, from any external control, is practically incapable 
of making any progress in civilization until it has learnt to obey. The 
indispensable virtue, therefore, in a government which establishes itself over a 
people of this sort is, that it make itself obeyed. To enable it to do this, the 
constitution of the government must be nearly, or quite, despotic. (Ibid., 394) 
 
Individuals, he suggests, must initially be forced to cooperate in order to overcome 
“the difficulty of inducing a brave and warlike race to submit their individual 
arbitrium to any common umpire” (Logic, CW VIII.921).  
Part of the significance of these passages is that Mill seems to accept the basic 
Hobbesian point that the state of nature is the worst state. Even living under a despot 
is better, because at the very least it lays the groundwork for future possible 
improvements (“Civilization,” CW XVIII.120). Unlike Hobbes, however, Mill 
argues that eventually individuals who have developed cooperative tendencies will 
no longer require a despot to force cooperation. At that point, the despot should make 
way for democracy and the vision of liberal society defended in On Liberty and The 
Subjection of Women. But the need for a public standard or “common umpire” will 
always remain: 
 
[S]ocial existence is only possible by a disciplining of those more powerful 
propensities, which consists in subordinating them to a common system of 
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11 A “civilized” society is marked by: (1) “a dense population, therefore, dwelling in fixed 
habitations,” (2) “agriculture, commerce, and manufactures,” (3) “human beings acting together 
for common purposes in large bodies, and enjoying the pleasures of social intercourse,” and (4) 
“the arrangements of society, for protecting the persons and property of its members, are 
sufficiently perfect… to induce the bulk of the community to rely for their security mainly upon 
social arrangements” (“Civilization,” CW XVIII.120). 
opinions. The degree of this subordination is the measure of the completeness of 
the social union, and the nature of the common opinions determines its kind. But 
in order that mankind should conform their actions to any set of opinions, these 
opinions must exist, must be believed by them. And thus, the state of the 
speculative faculties, the character of the propositions assented to by the intellect, 
essentially determines the moral and political state of the community. (Logic, CW 
VIII.926) 
  
Without recognized general rules of social morality, we would be left with 
“perpetual quarrelling” (Letter to Grote (1862), CW XV.762) and the threat of social 
dissolution: “The people for whom the form of government is intended must be 
willing to accept it; or at least not so unwilling, as to oppose an insurmountable 
obstacle to its establishment” (CRG, CW XIX.376).12 
Consistent with significant variations among social moralities and legal 
institutions in this social development, Mill identifies three general historical 
requisites for any “society that has maintained a collective existence” (Logic, CW 
VIII.920), each of which concerns the dispositions and beliefs of the people living 
in those societies. The first requisite he identifies is a “system of education” that, 
among other things, is able to carry on training each person in “restraining 
discipline,” i.e. “that habit… of subordinating his personal impulses and aims, to 
what were considered the ends of society” according to some shared or public 
standard (Ibid., 921). It calls for compromise and deference to a common umpire in 
the form of recognized social or political rules and authorities. This is a negative 
requisite insofar as it involves mainly forbearance on the part of each individual. 
The second requisite for social stability is more positive, namely, the existence 
of some unifying principle or object that grounds a “feeling of allegiance, or loyalty.” 
This may be generated by different things, such as a charismatic leader or national 
identity. In developed, non-despotic societies Mill hopes that this loyalty could 
“attach itself to the principles of freedom and political and social equality, as realized 
in institutions which as yet exist nowhere…” (Ibid., 922). This suggestion expresses 
an idea at the very core of liberalism, that what could unite a people is equal respect 
for each other’s individuality.  
                                                          
12 In some passages, Mill speaks directly to the need for social morality, and in others he speaks 
to the need for law or government. For our purposes, I am glossing over that distinction because 
he distinguishes them mainly in the means they employ and not in their basic justification. This, 
one might note, is true also of Mill’s liberty principle, which applies to both government and social 
authority, and concerns both “legal penalties” and “the moral coercion of public opinion” (CW 
VIII.223). I here leave aside the question of which social expectations should be enforced through 
formal mechanisms and which not. 
The third general requisite for social stability is, he writes, “a principle of 
sympathy… a feeling of common interest among those who live under the same 
government” (Ibid., 923). This is not the same as the feeling of allegiance to a leader 
or ideal. It is the feeling of solidarity to each other, “that they are one people, that 
their lot is cast together” (Ibid., 923). It supports community and mutual concern, 
and opposes both invidious distinctions and free-riding. This is what Mill elsewhere 
seems to mean by “sociality” (Letter to Ward (1859), CW XV.650). 
None of these conditions is sufficient on its own for social stability; remove any 
of them and the problem of conflicting propensities and judgments re-emerges. But 
together these conditions allow for the existence of “public authorities” in the form 
of stable laws or social rules, functioning tribunals, and “an organized force of some 
sort to execute their decisions” (Ibid., 920). Undoubtedly, there will still be 
disagreements, but these will occur against a backdrop that allows for a stable 
collective existence grounded in shared feelings, ideals, and procedures.  
Not surprisingly, Mill also argues that the development of social morality and 
legal institutions will require taking account of people’s happiness. But the present 
point is that the three requisites make possible a kind of “fellow-feeling” around a 
shared set of beliefs and values, which—because of that very fellow-feeling or 
coming together—constitute the standard by which we may hold others accountable: 
 
I feel conscious that if I violate certain laws, other people must necessarily or 
naturally desire that I shd be punished for the violation. I also feel that I shd desire 
them to be punished if they violated the same laws towards me. From these 
feelings & from my sociality of nature I place myself in their situation, & 
sympathize in their desire that I shd be punished; & (even apart from 
benevolence) the painfulness of not being in union with them makes me shrink 
from pursuing a line of conduct which would make my ends, wishes, & purposes 
habitually conflict with theirs.  (Letter to Ward, CW XV.650) 
 
In his own way, then, Mill introduces some of the basic elements of the public 
reason tradition: that people each have an interest in submitting their private 
judgments to a social morality (or other public authority); that a certain discipline of 
habit and thought is required to maintain that social morality; and that social morality 
appropriately governs our practices of holding each other accountable.  
It will be wondered what Mill would say about a social morality that is not 
optimal from the utilitarian perspective. Consider a case in which a different a set of 
normative expectations, if widely accepted, would in fact be more expedient (and 
are known by some to be so) than the current social morality, taking people as they 
are. As I understand the picture, Mill is committed to the view that the less optimal 
social morality, if it is in place, must nevertheless provide the basis for our practices 
of holding each other accountable. This is because the function of social morality is 
to solve the problem of private conflict. Without a solution to this problem, there 
would be no stable society at all. And to solve it, social morality must be publicly 
accessible and widely shared.13  
Social morality grants individuals the right to enforce (through practices of blame 
or punishment) the expectations contained in the common set of opinions. Others 
may enforce those rules against you (and vice versa), and whether to do so is left to 
their discretion ultimately because they have a right to self-protection. As noted 
before, they might err in the sense that exacting a punishment might not be expedient 
in a given case, but so long as they are enforcing social morality you would not be 
entitled to complain. Whether punishment is fitting—whether you have done 
something “wrong” in that sense—is only a matter of whether others may rightfully 
blame or otherwise punish you, given social morality.14 If the expectations licensing 
these judgments were not widely shared, they would neither solve private conflict 
nor maintain social stability. 
The reliance on common opinion does not mean, however, that the existing social 
morality is beyond criticism: “…bad as well as good institutions create moral 
obligations; but to erect these into a moral argument against changing the 
institutions, is as bad morality as it is bad reasoning” (“Newman’s Political 
Economy” [Newman] (1851), CW V.445). One important theme in Mill’s work is 
that the progressiveness of social morality depends on the availability of some 
external standard by which to criticize prevailing social morality. Following 
Bentham, this is one of his main arguments for utilitarianism and against the 
intuitionism of Whewell and others. Although intuitionists might be able to offer a 
social morality, they cannot provide a standard—at least not a publicly accessible 
one—by which to revise social morality: “The contest between the morality which 
appeals to an external standard, and that which grounds itself on internal conviction, 
is the contest of progressive morality against stationary—of reason and argument 
against the deification of mere opinion and habit” (“Whewell on Moral Philosophy” 
[Whewell] (1852), CW X. 179). He argues in similar terms that the feelings 
associated with social morality, such as guilt and resentment, should be shaped over 
time by the principle of utility:  
 
We are as much for conscience, duty, rectitude, as Dr. Whewell. The terms, and 
all the feelings connected with them, are as much a part of the ethics of utility as 
                                                          
13 I will address this issue at greater length in the final section. 
14 There will of course be disagreements about the content of social morality, its interpretation, 
and about the efficiency of each of us enforcing it and what enforcement measures are justified. 
These problems give us reason to introduce systems of adjudication and enforcement associated 
with what H.L.A. Hart called “secondary rules.” 
of that of intuition. The point in dispute is, what acts are the proper objects of 
those feelings;  whether we ought to take the feelings as we find them, as accident 
or design has made them, or whether the tendency of actions to promote 
happiness affords a test to which the feelings of morality should conform. 
(Whewell, CW X.172)  
 
In appealing to the principle of utility, then, Mill the reformer advocates for 
changes to the social morality he shares with others. But he does not believe that 
blameworthiness—and moral “wrongness” in that sense—can be divorced from 
social morality. Rather, those judgments must evolve with social morality over time: 
 
[I]nasmuch as every one, who avails himself of the advantages of society, leads 
others to expect from him all such positive good offices and disinterested services 
as the moral improvement attained by mankind has rendered customary, he 
deserves moral blame if, without just cause, he disappoints that expectation. 
Through this principle the domain of moral duty, in an improving society, is 
always widening. When what once was uncommon virtue becomes common 
virtue, it comes to be numbered among obligations, while a degree exceeding 
what has grown common, remains simply meritorious.” (Auguste Comte and 
Positivism, CW X.338; emphasis added) 
 
Here is perhaps Mill’s clearest statement that moral duty develops over time with 
changes in shared social expectations. In an “improving society” we can expect more 
of each other, if we educate our habits and thoughts at the same time that we work 
to reform our rules and institutions. 
Three clarifications are called for before we consider Mill’s account of the way 
we should engage each other within social morality. First, although Mill believes 
(following Bentham) that one advantage of the principle of utility itself is its public 
accessibility, he also recognizes that it is controversial. As we shall see, he therefore 
introduces mid-level principles that he believes can win support not just from those 
who share his views, but from anyone who is sensitive to the main lessons of history.   
Second, although I have sometimes referred to social morality as a system of 
rules, the shared normative expectations need not all be captured by rules. For Mill, 
the rules of social morality are general rules not expected to cover every 
circumstance. Rather, he emphasizes that there are cases in which individuals are 
rightly held accountable for failing to violate a general rule, and the individual 
“cannot discharge himself from moral responsibility by pleading that he had the 
general rule in his favor” (“Taylor’s Statesman,” CW XIX.640): 
 
What should we say to a physician, who communicated an agonising piece of 
family intelligence, in reply to the inquiry of our sick friend, at a moment when 
the slightest aggravation of malady threatened to place him beyond all hope of 
recovery? In a case like this, surely there is no man of common sense or virtue, 
who would think for a moment of sheltering himself under the inexorable law of 
veracity, and refusing to entertain any thought of the irreparable specific mischief 
on the other side. (Ibid.) 
 
Some thorny cases involve conflicting general rules, but sometimes they involve 
only “peculiarities of circumstances” (Utilitarianism, CW X.225). In what follows, 
I will sometimes refer to social morality as a set of rules, but it should be understood 
that for Mill the rules of social morality may have exceptions that are also part of 
our shared expectations. 
Third, the social rules might themselves express normative expectations that vary 
for individuals according to differences in position, influence, or capacity: 
 
There are times when the grandest results for the human race depend on the public 
assertion of one’s convictions at the risk of death by torture. When this is the case 
martyrdom may be a duty; & in cases when it does not become the duty of all it 
may be an admirable act of virtue in whoever does it, & a duty in those who as 
leaders or teachers are bound to set an example of virtue to others, & to do more 
for the common faith or cause than a simple believer.” (Letter to Young (1867), 
CW XVI.1328) 
 
The fact of shared normative expectations does not imply that the expectations for 
each of us are, in all ways, the same. Unfortunately, Mill does not develop this point 
in detail.  
In general, then, the moral or social reformer has two projects: first, to propose 
new general rules of social morality for individuals as they are currently constituted; 
second, to help educate individuals to become capable of inhabiting an even better 
social world. 
As we shall see, Mill argues that the first reform project must begin by critically 
evaluating prevailing social morality.  The main practical consideration is not where 
we start, but whether we have the means to progress from where we are. Above all, 
Mill argues, in a civilized society, the social conditions allowing for criticism and 
learning through experience must be protected against interference: “the source of 
everything respectable in man either as an intellectual or as a moral being,” he writes, 
“[is] that his errors are corrigible. He is capable of rectifying his mistakes, by 
discussion and experience” (On Liberty (1859), CW XVIII.231). Because revising 
our beliefs is “predominant, and almost paramount, among the agents of social 
progression,” Mill concludes that “the order of human progression in all respects 
will mainly depend on the order of progression in the intellectual convictions of 
mankind” (Logic, CW VIII.926, 927). Ensuring the conditions for moral 
improvement through “discussion and experience” thus becomes the leading theme 
of his moral and political philosophy, and shapes his account of the practice of public 
reason. 
 
3. THE PRACTICE OF PUBLIC REASON  
 
So far, then, we have seen that Mill regards social morality as more than a merely 
sociological or descriptive phenomenon. Social morality must govern much of our 
moral decision-making, specifically our holding each other accountable. Mill 
accepts a version of the practical problem that animates the public reason tradition, 
the problem of conflicting private judgments, and the corresponding need to 
establish a publicly justified standard or procedure by which to regulate our social 
and political lives together.  
But how are we supposed to accommodate disagreement about what social 
morality should be, and how can we revise social morality, while maintaining its 
integrity? This is the question of the practice of public reason, in which social 
morality is an ongoing construction project for a community.15 It is particularly 
important for Mill because he argues that we are never justified in believing that our 
current social morality—even if it is unanimously accepted—is the best it could be.16  
As I suggested at the end of the last section, Mill’s approach to the practice of 
public reason begins with the observation that at any given time and place there are 
certain “received opinions.”17 These, he seems to say, must be our starting points. 
But what emerges from his discussion of public reasoning is that he is less concerned 
with the specific content of prevailing beliefs than he is with preserving the 
conditions necessary for the effective criticism of those beliefs. Unlike some public 
reason views, for Mill it is not problematic in itself that the prevailing beliefs are 
controversial, so long as they can be, and are, sincerely held open to revision.18 The 
continued openness to discussion and social experimentation is what keeps social 
morality and legal institutions within reason—what makes them reasonable—on 
Mill’s view. Call this Mill’s legitimacy constraint. A prevailing social morality 
violates that constraint by removing itself from those processes of public reasoning 
                                                          
15 For a partly Mill-inspired approach to morality along these lines, see Kitcher (2011). 
16 This is the basic point of his “assumption of infallibility” argument in chapter 2 of On Liberty.  
17 See extended quotation later in this section from “Lord Brougham's Defence of the Church 
Establishment” (1834), CW VI.228. 
18 See Eric MacGilvray (2004) for development of this important thought. 
that might lead it is own revision.19 This is why he criticizes the French Assembly 
in 1848 for placing restrictions on the press. 
 
It denies them free discussion. It says they shall not be suffered to bring their 
opinions to the touchstone of the public reason and conscience. It refuses them 
the chance which every sincere opinion can justly claim, of triumphing in a fair 
field. It fights them with weapons which can as easily be used to put down the 
most valuable truth as the most pernicious error. (“The French Law Against the 
Press” (1848), CW XXV.1118). 
 
A good government, then, puts freedom of discussion first: “In government, perfect 
freedom of discussion in all its modes—speaking, writing, and printing—in law and 
in fact is the first requisite of good because the first condition of popular intelligence 
and mental progress. All else is secondary” (Diary (1854), CW XXVII.661). A 
prevailing morality might be controversial in many ways, but it is not illegitimate as 
long as it is sincerely held open to the processes of criticism and social 
experimentation that could lead to its improvement. 
In full view, Mill’s defense of the legitimacy constraint is grounded in his account 
of what is required for social improvement, and our never being in a position to say 
here progress ends.20 As early as the age of eighteen, he criticizes the Edinburgh 
Review for seeming to argue “that morality will never be better understood than at 
present; that morality will never be better practised than at present; that mankind 
will never be more prudent than they now are; that vigour of intellect and sound 
views of human affairs are oftener found and better listened to at this moment, than 
they are likely to be at any future period” (“Periodical Literature: Edinburgh 
Review” (1824), CW I.318). This constant refrain in his work culminates in his 
“assumption of infallibility” argument in On Liberty and the claim that the power to 
silence discussion is “illegitimate”: “The best government has no more title to it than 
the worst” (CW XVIII.229). Mill argues that, to the extent that a government 
undermines free discussion, it removes itself from the means of criticism and 
intellectual improvement that allow for its own future decision-making to improve. 
Insofar as it does this, it takes up a position of epistemic superiority toward posterity 
which it is not entitled to adopt – as if its decisions could not be improved upon 
(Turner 2013a). In a characteristic passage, he concludes: 
 
                                                          
19 This might happen in more or less significant ways. But to become separated from those 
processes is to make the prevailing social morality a matter simply of the preferences of the 
dominant group. This will undermine its tendency toward improvement and, relatedly, its claim to 
offer a fair field of play to those who disagree. 
20 For examples, see Turner (2013a, section 3). 
Until… somebody else can point out any existing state of society which it is 
desirable to have stereotyped for perpetual use, we must regard as an evil, all 
restraint put upon the spirit which never yet since society existed has been in 
excess—that which bids us “try all things” as the only means by which with 
knowledge and assurance we can “hold fast to that which is good.” (Newman, 
CW V.457; but see 454-7) 
 
As individuals, then, our participation in the practice of public reason is exhibited 
fundamentally by our ongoing support for the social conditions required for free, 
critical discussion and associated experiments of living on a fair field of play. Call 
this Mill’s basic norm of public reason. The practice of public reason is one in which 
we may propose any idea we like so long as it remains open to criticism, and 
collectively we may adopt any new set of institutions so long as they are consistent 
with, and responsive to, the ongoing critical enterprise. The core public reason 
commitment just is to maintaining those (liberal) practices and institutions that 
facilitate that enterprise. In this way, social and political arrangements are made 
consistent with the possibility of progress, and ensure that any future “permanence” 
in those arrangements “will be the effect of reason and free choice, not of irrevocable 
engagements” (Ibid., 456).21 
Undoubtedly, we will need formal mechanisms for settling disputes, and in 
Considerations on Representative Government and related writings Mill designs a 
set of democratic institutions to do just that. But the crucial thing for our purposes is 
understanding that those institutional designs must be consistent with his underlying 
commitment to preserving the conditions that allow for public criticism, reasoned 
decision-making, and progress. 
What the basic norm of public reason entails in practice for particular individuals 
is expressed nicely by some of Mill’s writings on education, particularly those 
concerning the spirit in which a teacher should present controversial material and 
the intellectual discipline that should then shape the classroom discussion. In these 
passages, he emphasizes that controversial views are not problematic as long as the 
                                                          
21 Gaus has claimed that Mill’s “master argument” in On Liberty is the broadly social epistemic 
argument for open society that helps to justify what I call his legitimacy constraint and his basic 
norm of public reason. Gaus argues that, despite differences in values and beliefs, openness to 
discussion and social experimentation is a value shared “among all citizens who think that some 
ways of living are better, that we have an interest in finding out which they are, and that we can 
have justified beliefs about what they are” (Gaus 2008, 100; see also Turner 2017, 576-9). After 
Mill, perhaps the most prominent versions of this argument are in Dewey (1927, 1939) and Popper 
(1945, 2008).  
material is taught in a way that is meant to engage and develop students’ critical 
capacities: 
 
It is true mankind differ widely on religion; so widely that is impossible for them 
to agree in recommending any set of opinions. But they also differ on moral 
philosophy, metaphysics, politics, political economy, and even medicine; all of 
which are admitted to be as proper subjects as any others for a national course of 
instruction. The falsest ideas have been, and still are, prevalent on these subjects, 
as well as on religion. But it is the portion of us all, to imbibe the received 
opinions first, and start from these to acquire better ones. All that is necessary to 
render religion as unexceptionable a subject of national teaching as any of the 
other subjects which we have enumerated, is, that it should be taught in the 
manner in which all rational persons are agreed that every other subject should 
be taught—in an inquiring, not a dogmatic spirit—so as to call forth, not so as to 
supersede, the freedom of the individual mind. We should most strongly object 
to giving instruction on any disputed subject, in schools or universities, if it were 
done by inculcating any particular set of opinions. 
…Let the teaching be in this spirit, and it scarcely matters what are the 
opinions of the teacher: and it is for their capacity to teach thus, and not for the 
opinions they hold, that teachers ought to be chosen.” (“Lord Brougham's 
Defence of the Church Establishment,” CW VI.228) 
 
The principle itself of dogmatic religion, dogmatic morality, dogmatic 
philosophy, is what requires to be rooted out; not any particular manifestation of 
that principle. 
…the object is to call forth the greatest possible quantity of intellectual power, 
and to inspire the intensest love of truth: and this without a particle of regard to 
the results to which the exercise of that power may lead, even though it should 
conduct the pupil to opinions diametrically opposite to those of his teachers. We 
say this, not because we think opinions unimportant, but because of the immense 
importance which we attach to them…  
…We are not so absurd as to propose that the teacher should not set forth his 
own opinions as the true ones, and exert his utmost powers to exhibit their truth 
in the strongest light… As a general rule, the most distinguished teacher is 
selected, whatever be his particular views, and he consequently teaches in the 
spirit of free inquiry, not of dogmatic imposition. (“Civilization,” CW 
XVIII.144) 
 
In On Liberty and other writings, Mill goes on to articulate a “real morality of public 
discussion,” emphasizing candor, openness, and “giving merited honour to every 
one, whatever opinion he may hold” (On Liberty, CW XVIII.259), while 
condemning intolerance, exaggeration, “casuistry and imposture,” and “hypocrisy” 
(“Perfectibility” (1828), CW XXVI.433). If we could imagine a community of 
public reasoners engaging each other in this spirit—each with their own beliefs and 
values, but also fundamentally committed to the practice of free inquiry—we would 
go a long way toward appreciating his vision of how social morality might improve 
over time without undermining (and perhaps reinforcing) the requisites of social 
stability addressed above. 
 
 
4. JUSTIFYING INTERFERENCE 
 
To this point, I have tried to show, first, that Mill solves a version of the problem of 
private conflict by appealing to the idea of social morality, and that he introduces a 
legitimacy constraint and basic norm of public reason that are justified by the need 
to revise social morality over time. In this section I want to examine three practical 
principles that Mill argues should enjoy public support and shape revisions to social 
morality: the presumption in favor of individual liberty, the presumption in favor of 
equality, and the liberty principle.22 Consistent with his own utilitarian 
commitments, but not dependent on them, he recommends these principles to the 
public conscience as the fruits of common human experience. 
If in the last section we glimpsed how Mill handles controversy within public 
reason, here the question is the extent to which people can come to agree on certain 
principles. In an early essay, Mill is very optimistic that there could be significant 
convergence on social rules, despite foundational differences: 
 
The grand consideration is, not what any person regards as the ultimate end of 
human conduct, but through what intermediate ends he holds that his ultimate 
end is attainable, and should be pursued: and in these there is a nearer agreement 
between some who differ, than between some who agree, in their conception of 
the ultimate end. When disputes arise as to any of the secondary maxims, they 
can be decided, it is true, only by an appeal to first principles; but the necessity 
of this appeal may be avoided far oftener than is commonly believed; it is 
surprising how few, in comparison, of the disputed questions of practical morals, 
require for their determination any premises but such as are common to all 
philosophic sects. (“Blakey’s History of Moral Science” (1833) CW X.29) 
                                                          
22 My discussion in this section is indebted to Gaus (2008). 
 We might wonder what overlap of “intermediate ends” Mill has in mind – what are 
the “secondary maxims” that allow for a relatively stable social morality? Obvious 
candidates include general rules such as those against taking innocent life and 
arbitrary violence, or in favor of truth-telling and tending to the sick. Surely such 
widely accepted rules would be part of any social morality. But Mill also spent much 
of his career addressing issues on which there was vigorous disagreement, including 
(just to name some of his preoccupations) women’s rights, slavery, domestic 
violence, free trade, and population control, some of which promised to cause 
significant social strife.  
In the rest of this section, I argue that Mill introduces three main public principles 
to help us navigate disagreement. This is not to ignore Mill’s own utilitarian 
arguments for various practical conclusions, but to highlight the principles he 
thought could help us find common ground. Two of them are stated in the following 
passage: 
 
The à priori presumption is in favour of freedom and impartiality. It is held that 
there should be no restraint not required by the general good, and that the law 
should be no respecter of persons, but should treat all alike, save where 
dissimilarity of treatment is required by positive reasons, either of justice or of 
policy. (The Subjection of Women [Subjection] (1869), CW XXI.262) 
 
The first principle expressed here, the “presumption in favor of liberty,”23 is a 
general “non-interference” principle according to which “the onus of making out a 
case always lies on the defenders of legal prohibitions” (Principles of Political 
Economy [Principles] (1848), CW III.936, 938). In the context of free discussion 
and social experimentation, the presumption in favor of liberty can help us choose 
among candidate social rules and legal arrangements. It is justified, he argues, by at 
least two widely accepted considerations. First, the freedom to live one’s life as one 
sees fit—at least in many respects—is a good felt by most or all individuals: “He 
who would rightly appreciate the worth of personal independence as an element of 
happiness, should consider the value he himself puts upon it as an ingredient of his 
own” (Subjection, CWXXI.336-7). Whether a utilitarian or not, our commonly felt 
irritation at being interfered with reveals that we all care about preserving a range of 
personal freedom. Second, Mill believes history has shown that leaving activities to 
the voluntary action of individuals usually leads to better outcomes than placing 
them under the control of government or social authority: “…freedom of individual 
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choice is now known to be the only thing which procures the adoption of the best 
processes, and throws each operation into the hands of those who are best qualified 
for it” (Ibid., 273). Mill’s own social and political conclusions show that the 
presumption in favor of liberty can be overcome in a great many cases, but he 
considers it an important guidepost in considering revisions to social morality.  
An important extension of the presumption in favor of liberty is Mill’s claim that 
coercive (what he calls “authoritative”) interference requires more justification than 
non-coercive interference. The upshot of this extension is that social authority should 
be aware of when a non-coercive measure—one that merely provides us options or 
encourages us to do something—would obviate the need for an authoritative 
measure that constrains our options: “When a government provides means for 
fulfilling a certain end, leaving individuals free to avail themselves of different 
means if in their opinion preferable, there is no infringement of liberty, no irksome 
or degrading restraint. One of the principal objections to government interference is 
then absent” (Principles, CW III.938-9). The hope is that non-coercive measures 
could be widely accepted as a path toward social reform, even if the content of those 
reforms is otherwise controversial. Recently, this has been revived and developed as 
a public principle in the libertarian paternalism of Sunstein and Thaler (2008), which 
seeks to “nudge” us, instead of coerce us, to make better choices for ourselves. 
The second public principle expressed in the above passage is the presumption in 
favor of equality. What Mill calls “impartiality” there is the principle that social 
morality and the law should not make distinctions among persons except where there 
is good reason for it. This is a central theme, for instance, in his rejection of women’s 
inequality: 
 
…the course of history, and the tendencies of progressive human society, afford 
not only no presumption in favour of this system of inequality of rights, but a 
strong one against it; and that, so far as the whole course of human improvement 
up to the time, the whole stream of modern tendencies, warrants any inference on 
the subject, it is, that this relic of the past is discordant with the future, and must 
necessarily disappear. (Subjection, CW XXI.272)  
 
The new default for all groups, Mill argues, should be a presumption of equality – it 
is inequalities that require justification. He is aware of the motivated reasoning 
keeping certain prejudices in place, but he argues that as social morality has 
developed, and whatever concrete rules we might endorse concerning particular 
matters, it has increasingly been understood to embody respect among equals: 
 
[C]ommand and obedience are but unfortunate necessities of human life: 
society in equality is its normal state. Already in modern life, and more and 
more as it progressively improves, command and obedience become 
exceptional facts in life, equal association its general rule. The morality of the 
first ages rested on the obligation to submit to power; that of the ages next 
following, on the right of the weak to the forbearance and protection of the 
strong. How much longer is one form of society and life to content itself with 
the morality made for another? We have had the morality of submission, and 
the morality of chivalry and generosity; the time is now come for the morality 
of justice. Whenever, in former ages, any approach has been made to society 
in equality, Justice has asserted its claims as the foundation of virtue. 
(Subjection, CW XXI.293-4) 
 
In his clearest expression of an ideal of social morality—though, again, consistent 
with varying social rules—Mill argues that complete equality offers something of 
an end-point:  
 
[T]he true virtue of human beings is fitness to live together as equals; claiming 
nothing for themselves but what they as freely concede to every one else; 
regarding command of any kind as an exceptional necessity, and in all cases a 
temporary one; and preferring, whenever possible, the society of those with 
whom leading and following can be alternate and reciprocal. (Subjection, CW 
XXI.294) 
 
At the very least, Mill rejects authoritarian arrangements and inequalities based on 
race, ethnicity, religion, and gender, and he calls instead for respect for each other 
as free and equal citizens, in a way that is that is characteristic of the public reason 
tradition. He suggests a picture of holding each other accountable that respects the 
logic of reciprocity. Educating a community capable of sustaining a social morality 
in this way would be a great achievement. 
Mill’s third public principle, the most famous of them, is the liberty principle 
(aka the harm principle). It introduces a strict anti-paternalism constraint on 
“authoritative” interference with competent individuals, according to which “the 
only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a 
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others” (On Liberty, CW 
XVIII.223). While the presumption in favor of liberty is quite broad and defeasible, 
the liberty principle is much narrower and absolute. Properly understood, it does not 
make a claim about when social interference is justified, but about the scope of 
society’s rightful authority: coercive interference may not even be considered by 
some social or governmental authority except to protect others from harm. To the 
extent that the actions of competent adults concern only themselves, they are 
“sovereign” and should be left free from authoritative interference.  
The justification of this principle is disputed territory, but I think it is important 
to see that Mill offers it up, at least in part, as a principle of public reason to help 
direct our revision of social morality in other respects. Gaus has argued that Mill’s 
strategy to justify this and other liberal principles is to appeal to a “wide array of 
citizens’ beliefs and values” (2008, 84; see also Rawls 2007, 284–91). My view is 
that the liberty principle is justified primarily by a shared interest in competent 
decision-making, and by evidence that individuals are the best judges of their own 
good (Turner 2013b). However it is justified, the liberty principle has been an 
incredibly influential public principle, shaping our notions of the appropriate limits 
of government and social interference with personal choices – including, most 
notably, sexual morality. 
Each of these three principles plays a significant part in Mill’s thinking, yet 
accepting them does not require taking up the utilitarian perspective. Rather, they 
demonstrate the extent to which he believes that we can collectively learn from 
experience and adopt principles to help us fashion an ever-improving social morality 
that maintains its integrity over time, despite ongoing disagreement on concrete 
matters. 
 
CONCLUSION: THE CONNECTION TO UTILITY 
 
I have tried to show that Mill recognizes both the problem of private conflict and the 
need for social morality to solve it, that he articulates a practice of public reason to 
revise social morality over time, and that he introduces certain public principles that 
he believes can enjoy broad public support to shape that process. Despite this, Mill’s 
basic commitments undoubtedly remain utilitarian. Social morality may define our 
moral obligations, but he also writes of “moral obligation, which in itself, and 
independently of the purposes for which it exists, cannot be accounted a good” 
(Newman, CW V.455). In this last section, then, I want to sketch how Mill’s 
commitment to social morality fits within his utilitarianism and, in particular, what 
sort of independence it has as a guide for individual moral agents. 
Although Mill rejects rule utilitarianism (or so I have argued in Turner 2015a), 
his account of social morality shares with it the thought that a practice could be 
justified on utilitarian grounds and that subsequent decisions within that practice 
should then generally proceed without direct reference to the principle of utility (see 
Rawls 1955). Unlike the rule utilitarian, Mill expects us to appeal directly to utility 
in exceptional cases.24 But he argues that our commitment to social morality—to 
abiding by a shared set of normative expectations—is itself justified by the principle 
of utility and that the integrity of social morality over time requires us to form of a 
habit of deference, a sense of allegiance, and fellow-feeling. Moreover, because he 
believes that the state of nature is the worst state, keeping our commitment to social 
morality outweighs most any other utilitarian consideration. This is, I think, the 
significance of the following passage: 
 
Scarcely any degree of utility, short of absolute necessity, will justify a 
prohibitory regulation, unless it can also be made to recommend itself to the 
general conscience; unless persons of ordinary good intentions either believe 
already, or can be induced to believe, that the thing prohibited is a thing which 
they ought not to wish to do. (Principles, CW III.938) 
 
New coercive measures that risk social unrest, and so the dissolution of social 
morality, can be justified only in extreme circumstances. The effect of this is to give 
great weight to maintaining our shared normative expectations. It means generally 
following the rules widely recognized in society, and being aware of when an 
exception to those rules would also be expected. In some cases, violating a social 
expectation might be justified—but it is important that doing so would not threaten 
the general practice of conforming to social morality.  
Certainly, at least in the great majority of circumstances, it entails a rejection of 
revolutionary attempts at reform. Thus, despite endorsing socialist ideas, Mill 
strongly objects to the “revolutionary Socialists” of the 19th century:  
 
[T]hose who would play this game on the strength of their own private opinion, 
unconfirmed as yet by any experimental verification—who would forcibly 
deprive all who have now a comfortable physical existence of their only present 
means of preserving it, and would brave the frightful bloodshed and misery that 
would ensue if the attempt was resisted—must have a serene confidence in their 
own wisdom on the one hand and a recklessness of other people’s sufferings on 
the other. (Chapters on Socialism, CW V.737) 
 
One way to consider the place of social morality in Mill’s overall ethical theory 
is to think of his utilitarianism being applied stepwise. In the first step, it justifies the 
move from the state of nature to a state of society. And because it is hard to imagine 
that a return to the state of nature could be justified, Mill’s basic commitment to 
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utility is expressed practically by our support for the social morality that keeps us 
out of the state of nature. We might accept some risk of return, but Mill argues that 
the consequences of that would be so dire that we normally do better keeping to 
social morality and to piecemeal reform efforts through the practice of public reason.  
In the second step, then, Mill’s commitment to utility is extended as a practical 
matter to the basic norm of public reason required for the rational revision of social 
morality. This is part of the force of his claim in On Liberty that “I regard utility as 
the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions: but it must be utility in the largest sense, 
grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being” (CW VIII.224). 
Mill does not have in mind a fully-formed, ideal social morality that would allow us 
to reverse engineer social reforms. We can concentrate our attention on “the 
immediate impediment to progress” (CRG, CW XIX.396; emphasis added), but 
beyond that the key thing is to defend the free discussion and social experimentation 
that alone give us hope of learning from experience and the assurance that future 
changes to social morality will constitute improvements. 
It bears repeating that, at any given point in time, social morality is unlikely to 
be optimal from the perspective of any particular person. But it provides what Gaus 
calls a “moral constitution” – a public standard that each of us has sufficient reason 
to endorse even though, like our legal constitution, it is “not to be equated with any 
specific moral perspective, with its particular understanding of values, rightness, and 
the morally relevant nature of the social world” (Gaus 2016, 179). On the view I 
have been defending, Mill accepts this basic picture and then emphasizes that the 
moral constitution, like a legal constitution, must allow for its own revision through 
free discussion and social experimentation. This latter thought animates his vision 
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